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BOOK REVIEW
MEANING AND DEVELOPMENT BEHIND AMERICAN LAW
LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY. By Lawrence M.

Friedman. New York: Modem Library, A Division of
Random House, Inc. 2002. Pp. 207. $19.95 (hardback).
Reviewed by Britney Beall-Eder*
INTRODUCTION

As American law develops over time, the meaning and implications
of our cultural norms mirror society's chosen rules. At times, American
law can produce unjust results.' However, just, in addition to unjust, re2
suits develop historically based on the values and customs of the times.
The development of American law has been a rich and diverse process,
creating a complex legal system based on customs, values, and interpretations of the Constitution, sometimes static and other times changing
with society. Understanding the law's developmental process explains
the law's current role in everyday American life in the new millennium.
Lawrence M. Friedman's Law in America: A Short History explains the
role of law in American society from the colonial period to the present to
illustrate his theory that "American law is a reflection of what goes on in
American society in general. '4
Friedman's chronological account of American history correlates
the law to the values, enforcement mechanisms, and societal norms of
different historical periods. Although the legal historian may need to
look elsewhere and delve deeper to understand legal history, this book
gives a short, illustrative account of the role of American law in history
for the layperson.
Structurally, Friedman divides the book into four parts reflecting on
four different eras: the colonial period, the nineteenth century, the twentieth century, and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Within each
time period, Friedman evaluates major themes and developments in the
law pertaining to that era. Friedman's use of temporal categorization
*
J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Denver College of Law.
I. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (establishing the "separate but equal"
the two races are to meet upon terms of
doctrine, which validated segregation, and holding that "[iuf
social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits
and a voluntary consent of individuals."), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 6-7 (2002).
2.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 12-13.
3.
4. Id. at 37.
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creates a historical narrative of the past for the reader, but gives substantially less attention than others.5
In this review, Part I explores the law in colonial times, specifically
evaluating the influence of English law upon colonial ideology. In addition, Part I looks at Friedman's account of colonial slavery and the progression towards independence from England. Part II examines the law's
development during the nineteenth century and the changes that Friedman contends resulted from the development of American law beyond
the borrowed common law from England. Part HI summarizes the dramatic increase in legislation in the twentieth century. It also explores
Friedman's view of the changing role of law enforcement, tort and contract law, and the impact of the civil rights movement. Finally, Part IV
explores the beginning of the twenty-first century through Friedman's
eyes and the impact of past generations of the law on contemporary society.
I. COLONIAL AMERICA AND THE LAW

In Law in America: A Short History, Lawrence M. Friedman devotes little space to colonial law, briefly describing the role of American
law in the colonial period. Friedman focuses on three underlying themes:
the relationship between law and religious values; colonial slavery; and
the progression towards independence from England. The extremely
limited scope of Friedman's discussion of colonial America tends to devalue the impact of early American law, thus presenting a less-thanaccurate picture of the era.
A. Law to Achieve Religious Morality
Friedman begins by discussing the emergence of colonial law. "In
essence, [the colonial legal system] was English law-at least in the
sense that this was the only system the colonists knew anything about." 6
However, in addition to following the English law, Friedman contends
the colonists also incorporated their own values and needs into American
law.7 Friedman asserts, in effect, that this integration contradicted the
ideologies of traditional English men and women. 8 For example, the Puritans developed law to achieve what they perceived was a more holy
society. 9 Friedman argues that the Puritans implemented procedures in
5.

See Carl A. Pierce, The Law in America, 42 TENN. L. REV. 615, 619 (1975) (reviewing

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973)). In reviewing Friedman's earlier
book, Pierce asserts that Friedman fails to give adequate attention to certain time periods. Id. Here,
the colonial period is given substantially less attention in the book than the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Thus, although being criticized for the flaw in analysis twenty-seven years earlier,
Friedman still fails to give adequate attention to certain time periods, most particularly the colonial

era.
6.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 24.

7.
8.
9.

See id.
See id.
See id.
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their daily lives that they believed would help to achieve a godly society. 10 The Puritans, therefore, designed and orchestrated a legal system
that would achieve results they desired."
Friedman makes an interesting point in asserting that the Puritans
shaped the law to fit the religious morals they strove to achieve. He fails,
however, to adequately connect colonial law and the reasons underlying
the Puritans need for intertwining religion with law. Why did the Puritans need religion in order to form a moral society? To that effect, why
did they need law when they had religion? And more importantly, how
did they make the conversion from technical English law to a hodgepodge set of rules defined by religious values and morals of the time?
Friedman, therefore, proposes a viable thesis, but fails to adequately explain himself.
B. Colonial Slavery
Friedman also discusses slavery during the colonial era. He asserts
that one of the mirrors shining back at the colonists was, unfortunately,
the law of slavery.' 2 Although "slavery was unknown to England, and3
English law," by 1640, "legal" slavery appeared in Virginia's history.'
Friedman posits that "a strong consciousness of race" was a key aspect
in the development of the slave custom and laws, as it certainly did not
fit in with the godly society of many colonial communities. 14 Although
slavery was an immoral practice of the colonists, Friedman explains that
the slaves served an important role in supporting the colonial economy. 5
Specifically, labor shortages on the sugar plantations drove the demand
for slaves. 16 The Africans transported to the colonies were "culturally
and racially" different from the colonists. 17 Friedman posits that "[t]he
deep consciousness of race-America's original sin-helped to bind8
these foreign servants to a status that degraded and exploited them."'1
Friedman, however, fails to explain the source of race consciousness.
Why did white colonists perceive African slaves differently from, for
example, white indentured servants? Was race consciousness the cause
of the African slave trade or was race consciousness its result?
10.
See id. at 24-25.
11.
See id. at 25 (explaining that the Puritans lived in "small, tight-knit, hierarchical" communities where the leading voices in the community were the clergy and the male heads of the household). The Puritans believed that their ideologies and societal values were best represented by male
clergy and, thus, reprimanded those in their community who did not conform to their values by
punishing church truancy, blasphemy, and morally reprehensible behavior. Id. at 24-25.
12.
See id. at 25-26.
13.
Id. at 26-27.
14.
Id.at 27.
15.
See id. at 28.
See id. ("Blacks were imported from Africa to do the hard work in the fields. Slavery was
16.
well known in Africa, and the slave trade depended on African help in enslaving other Africans.").
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
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As slavery became more rooted in colonial life, so too did the growing "body of slave law."'19 Slave law gave slavery the stamp of approval,
thus further instilling racism into colonial America.20 Friedman argues
that "the law codified custom and crystallized it; it put its enforcement
power behind the 'peculiar institution. ' ' 21 In subsequent chapters,
Friedman describes slavery's unfortunate and lasting effects. In contending that there remains no equivalent to the damaging effects of American
slave law,22 Friedman distinguishes his approach to the colonial era from
that of most historians, who place the greatest emphasis in the colonial
times on the progression towards independence from England.23
C. ProgressionTowards Independencefrom England and the Emergence of Early American Law
By the time of King George III's reign, colonial America had grown
quite different from old England.24 Friedman explains that, except for
slavery, colonial America was much
more
than England due
1
• egalitarian
~25
"Ae
to the differing conditions in the colonies. In colonial America, land
was more abundant and society was less organized.26 People born in the
colonies had no incentive to remain loyal to the mother country. 27 Although Friedman effectively explains the significance of the physical
separation and the geographic differences between England and the
colonies, he still undervalues religion as an impetus for the colonists'
move for independence, which culminated in the Revolutionary War.
After the war, the colonies set out to form an independent republic. 28 "It was to be a 'government of laws and not of men.' 29 The colonists' decision to pledge their allegiance, not to a king, but to the law,
was "the basis for the experiment in democracy---or at least in democracy as defined by the leading men of the time., 30 This "American experiment," Friedman explains, was a society based on "laws,
rules[, and]
3
general principles," rather than the divine rights of royalty. '
The first attempt at creating colonial American law resulted in the
Articles of Confederation.32 Friedman posits that, because the Articles of
19.
Id. at 29.
20.
See id.
21.
Id. Specifically, Friedman divides slave law into three categories in the colonial period:
rules pertaining to the status of black slaves, rules pertaining to controlling and punishing slaves, and
technical law dealing with their rights to property, water, etc. Id. at 29-30.
22. See id. at 30.
23. Id.at 31.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 31-32.
26.
See id. at 32.
27.
See id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30. Id.
31.
Id.at 33.
32.
See id.
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Confederation formed a weak central government, they proved unsuc33
cessful at providing a legal framework capable of unifying the colonies. 34
As a result, a convention proposed and adopted a federal constitution.
The Constitution, Friedman argues, "has lasted so long, and served the
country so well, because it is brief and general-helped by the fact that it
acquired, very soon, a kind of aura of the sacred. 35 In effect, the Constitution was the voice of the people; it established fundamental principles
and rules that apply across time. 36
Although the reader is left trying to connect early colonial religious
values to the constitutional framework that ultimately emerged, Friedman does an artful job of explaining the progression towards freedom in
colonial America. Friedman's past writings on the topic have been criticized for not evaluating the relationship between law and morals in the
colonial period.37 Here, Friedman adequately makes this connection.
However, more space could be devoted to other important building
blocks of the era, such as "the politicization of legal issues, 38 "economic
instrumentalism, ''39 and other legal institutions that had an impact on the
future of American law. 4°
Although Friedman acknowledges that traditional English law was
the only law with which the colonists were familiar,4 ' ultimately, he underestimates colonial law's impact upon American legal history. In a
review of another Friedman book on American legal history, Carl A.
Pierce makes a similar criticism. 42 In the earlier book, Friedman suggests
that "only collectors and historians care about Massachusetts' laws of
4
16 3 0 ,, 3 which may explain why Friedman's account of the colonial period is so brief in comparison to other periods. However, understanding
why the colonists deviated from the common law when developing their
own American law could explain the gradual move of the law toward a
democratic nation.
In addition, Friedman underestimates the value of colonial history.
Colonial law can be seen as much more than a reflection of the colonial
life; it also can be viewed as reflecting the old common law of England,

33. See id.
34. See id. (stating that the Constitution drafted by the founding forefathers "was the first and
only Constitution of the United States" and is the "oldest living constitution" in the world).
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 620 (criticizing Friedman's earlier work for failing to connect
colonial law with the relevant moral values of the time).
38. See Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Low in Colonial America, in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 257 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
39. Pierce, supra note 5, at 620.
40. Id. at 620-21.
41.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 24.

42.
43.

Pierce, supra note 5, at 619.
Id. (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 29).
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which became a building block of a new American law. 44 For example, a
"colonial legal historian might emphasize the continuity of both public
and private law from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries and argue
persuasively that the nineteenth century' cannot
be comprehended absent
5
a knowledge of its colonial antecedents. A
Friedman's overview of colonial America leaves larger gaps in the
law's development than sections describing other eras. Friedman seems
to follow consumer demand in this book by devoting relatively more
attention to post-colonial times.46 However, his choice to downplay the
colonial era may be justified in that Friedman's expertise lies in postcolonial American law and economics .47 In this regard, Friedman's explanation of the history of slavery and general overview of early colonial
times only skims the surface. Although the book is just a "short history,"
greater depth of treatment of the colonial period would give the reader a
stronger historical base upon which to build in understanding subsequent
eras.
II. PROGRESSION OF LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Friedman's account of the nineteenth century is more comprehensive than that of other temporal eras in the book. The nineteenth century
produced a huge body of law relating to the economy. 48 Friedman primarily looks at the relationships among the economy, the law, and society. However, in the nineteenth century, he also shows how social aspects of society can move the law to achieve society's desired results. 49
This review evaluates just a few of Friedman's central themes for this
era: the myth of a laissez-faire economy; the dramatic change in tort
law; the rise of the contracts clause; slavery; and crime and punishment.
A. Laissez-faire:Myth or Reality?
Friedman contends that the notion that the nineteenth century was
the era of laissez-faire economics is not entirely true because the government's influence on the economy was significant. 50 Friedman initially
contends that, during this period, the government gave people rights "so
basic that people tended to take them for granted." 5' Many people took
44. See id. at 621.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 619-20; see also supra notes 5, 37-45 and accompanying text.
47. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 623.
48. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 37.
49. Id.
50. Id. ("[People] took for granted, for example, the idea of private property-in land, in
commodities of all sorts.").
51.
Id. But see Richard A. Epstein, Legal History: The Assault That Failed: The Progressive
Critique of Laissez Faire, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1999) (reviewing BARBARA H. FRIED, THE
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS

MOVEMENT (1998)). Epstein argues, although the laissez-faire era takes a "cautious view of government power," the notion of laissez-faire did give immense value to the ideas of individual liberty,
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advantage of the basic right to contract, "the right to buy and sell, [and]
to make agreements, with the understanding that the force of law stood
behind these agreements. 5 2
The government had a larger impact on the economy in the nineteenth century than many historians credit. 53 Although the government's
presence in everyday life was not as pervasive in the nineteenth century
as it is today, 54 Friedman contends that the main aim of the government
then was "promotional; to enact laws to help the economy grow." 55 The
government concerned itself with creating ways to support the infrastructure of the "institutions that made economic growth possible. 56 For example, the government created "roads, canals, bridges, ferries, and (later)
railroads" in order that farmers and merchants could get their goods to
market. 57 The government also created what Friedman calls "the invisible infrastructure," which consisted of money, banks, and credit. 58 Although the government "had very little in the way of money," it had a
surplus of land.59 The government "used land grants to stimulate the
economy-grants to states for educational purposes, cheap land to settlers,"6 ° and uncultivated land to states "who would put it to productive
,
use.
Because of Friedman's "professional focus on state private law and
its relation to our economy, ,,61 some reviewers have characterized his
treatment of the economy as "over-emphasized" and at times bordering
"on the purely Marxian. ' '62 However, Friedman's unique view of American legal history enables the reader to compare not only law and society,
but also law and economics.
B. Applying Nineteenth Century Tort and ContractLaw
Friedman argues that the law of torts also took a dramatic turn in the
nineteenth century. 63 Torts constitute a civil, as opposed to a criminal,
wrong.64 Within tort doctrine, one of the largest nineteenth century developments was the law of negligence. 65 The Industrial Revolution inthe right to own property, and freedom of contract. Without these fundamental pieces of historical
power, American society could not operate as it does today. Id.
52.
53.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 37.
See id.

54. See id. at 37-38.
55. Id. at 38.
56. Id. at 40.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 40-41. For example, states received swamp lands that they could sell for money to
build drainage systems and levees. Id. at 41.
61.
Pierce, supra note 5, at 625.
62. Id. at 626.
63.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 43.

64.
65.

Id.
See id.
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creased the use of machinery in the workplace, thereby causing more
accidents resulting in bodily harm. 66 "Nothing does a better job of mangling human bodies than machines. 67 For example, Friedman notes that
"the explosion on the Sultana, a sidewheel steamboat, on April 27, 1865,
killed more than 1,700 people., 68 American law responded by, for the
first time, permitting an individual injured in an accident to recover dam69
ages without proving that the tortfeasor intended to injure the victim.
Many legal historians assert that the nineteenth century change in
tort law was a shift from "strict liability to a moralistic 'fault' principle. ' 70 Friedman comments that it was "not really accurate to talk about a
shift from strict liability; rather, there was a shift from no liability. '7 The
issue was not morality, but, instead, who should bear the risk of loss in
an action in tort. 72 Friedman takes a position similar to that of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., separating morality from the liability framework.73
Holmes believed that, because the common law was uninterested in
evaluating the "state of mind" of the individual in deciding liability in a
negligence action, there could be no "individual moral culpability" inherent in attributing liability to an individual.74 Holmes evaluated tort
law in terms of "standard[s] of external conduct. 75 Hence, tortfeasors
could be liable for 76
damages due to their negligence "even if they do their
incompetent best.,

Although the nineteenth century development of negligence in tort
created the legal vehicle for a victim to receive compensation for injury,
the law as applied at that time favored business over the individual in
determining where to place risks of lOSS. 77 Therefore, the external standards for reasonableness, by which an industry accused of doing wrong
was to be judged, were defined by industry itself.78 "The defendants were
the entrepreneurs, the doers, the bringers of wealth., 79 Friedman posits
66. See id. ("Railroad locomotives, belching fire and steam, and racing through the countryside were a tremendous source of injuries and deaths").
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 43-44.
70.
Id. at 44.
71.

id.

72.
73.

See id.
See A.W. Brian Simpson, 1997 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: VIII, Legal History:

The Elusive Truth About Holmes, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2027, 2028 (1997) (reviewing DAVID
ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: His THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY (1995)); see also O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881). "A man may have as

bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules.... What the law really forbids, and the
only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise."
Id. at 110.
74.
Simpson, supra note 73, at 2027.
75.
id. at 2028; see HOLMES, supra note 73, 110-11 ("The standard... must be fixed.").
76.
Simpson, supra note 73, at 2028.
77. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 44-45.
78. See id.
79.
Id. at 45.
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that, because the law follows society, law in the economic growthoriented nineteenth century followed the wealth. 80 Thus, the courts attributed liability to the wrongdoer only when the risk of loss fell on
someone other than an industrial defendant. 8'
To illustrate this point, Friedman discusses Farwell v. Boston &
Worcester Railroad Corporation.82 In Farwell, a railroad employee was
badly injured on the job due to the actions of another employee.83 Farwell sued his employer, the railroad, "claiming that the negligence of
another worker was the cause of his injury." 84 The plaintiff relied on the
old "master and servant" rule, which provided that, "if an agent (a servant or employee), on the job, does something that harms somebody else,
that somebody could sue the principal (the master or employer), because
the principal is generally responsible for the acts of the agent., 85 In this
case, however, the court held that the master-servant rule imposed liability on the employer only when the employee's actions injured a railroad
passenger, but did not apply when the victim was a fellow employee
engaged in the same work. 86 Friedman asserts that the underlying message from Farwellwas the power of enterprise and the movement of law
toward protecting business and industrial development. 87 Law favored
industry because society also favored industry.88 Society favored industry
because most Americans at this time lived in rural areas,89 so they
viewed development of the railroads and further enterprise as keys to
their economic prosperity. 90 Therefore, as Friedman suggests, morality
was not a relevant factor in determining liability during the rise of enterprise, rather determining risks of loss resulted from industrial development and the power of enterprise. 91
Friedman also discusses the impact of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Contracts Clause in the nineteenth century. 92 The Constitution prohibits individual states from enacting any regulation or law "impairing the obligation of a contract. '93 Friedman argues that the Contracts
Clause was "about the relationship of government and the economy, par-

See id. at 44-45.
See id. at 46.
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
Farwell, 45 Mass. at 55.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 45; see Farwell,45 Mass. at 55.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 45.
85.
86. Farwell, 45 Mass. at 54.
87.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 48.
88. See id. at 47.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 44-45.
92.
Ld.at 51. The Contracts Clause was most likely created to prevent states from interfering
with creditors' rights in bankruptcy cases. Id.
93.
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (The Contracts Clause states that: "No State shall...
pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts").
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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ticularly in times of great financial uncertainty." 94 Friedman asserts that
"the whole point of the 'contracts clause' was to prevent states from going too
far in helping out debtors," and thus to further protect enter95

prise.

The validity of Friedman's analysis is evident today in how courts
apply the Contracts Clause. Because the application of the Contracts
Clause in the courts can be inconsistent as a result of judicial discretion,
the government retains a vehicle to loosen or pull back the reigns of enterprise. 96 Courts do not interpret the Contracts Clause "to prohibit all
impairment of contracts." 97 Instead, the courts apply a balancing test that
weighs the "contractors' private rights with the public interest in a manner reminiscent of Lochner v. New York." 98 In a practical application of
the Contracts Clause, judges do not have to follow precedent explicitly
because "[blalancing allows judges to weigh competing values on an ad
hoc basis, which permits them to change the weight they give to different
values over time." 99
In effect, judicial discretion could have led to the opposite result of
Friedman's contention that the courts primarily chose to protect enterprise during this time period.'30 Because the balancing of interests is left
solely to judges, a decision could fall either way depending on the opinion of a particular judge.10' However, sentiments of judges will most
likely follow the economic and moral standards defining the law at a
given time, as evidenced in the nineteenth century.10 2 Judges apply the
balancing test according to their own legal interpretation of a particular
case at hand. 0 3 Thus, the Contracts Clause allows the judiciary to skew a
clear legal rule, resulting in the Contracts Clause creating uncertainty for
persons subject to contract, as well as security for governmental
inter°4
vention in contracting during times of economic hardship.
By limiting himself to a chronological, subject-by-subject analysis,
Friedman overlooks the impact of contract law upon tort law during the
nineteenth century. Although separately Friedman comes to interesting
conclusions regarding the relationship between torts and the economy,
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 5 .
95. Id. Friedman notes that most states by this time had insolvency laws to protect "at least
some basic items from the clutch of creditors." Id. at 53.
96. See Michael B. Rappaport, Note: A ProceduralApproach to the Contract Clause, 93
YALE L.J. 918, 919-22 (1984).
97. Id. at 919.
98. Id.; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (applying the contracts clause balancing test).
99. See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 920.
94.

100.

101.
102.
discretion
103.
104.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 51.

See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 920.
See, e.g., supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text (illustrating how the courts used their
to promote and protect economic development in the tort liability context).
See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 919-21.
See id. at 921.
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and contracts and the economy, he fails to show the interrelationship the
two legal subjects had on the economy as a whole. Specifically, during
the nineteenth century, the legal regime was designed to allow "contract
to dominate," thereby allowing a party to contract out of tort liability.'0 5
Thus, "[tiotal exemption or too great cutting down of remedy by 'contracting,' without regard for the tort phase of risk in hand" can result in
legal implications for both subject areas.' °6 In addition, by failing to consider the relationship between torts and contracts, Friedman fails to consider the affect that both legal subjects had in shaping and influencing
"social and economic behavior."' 0 7 After all, "while rules of law may be
same rules
enacted in response to social and economic pressures, those
10 8
will influence and shape social and economic behavior."'
C. Nineteenth Century Slavery
Slavery not only continued, but, according to Friedman, became a
stronger institution in the South during the first half of the nineteenth
century because it was a strongly contested political issue.' °9 After the
Revolutionary War, the northern states abolished slavery while the
southern states expanded the institution." 0 Slavery remained "vital to the
southern economy" and thus became "an essential aspect of the social
structure.""' By 1860, the population of slaves in the United States "had
grown to 3,922,760, all of them in the South."' "12 While Friedman discusses race consciousness as an underlying social issue in his colonial
account of slavery, his nineteenth century discussion of slavery explores
continuing social complexities, such as the rise of segregation. Friedman
points out that by the turn of the century, many Southerners accepted
segregation. In fact, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the United States Supreme
Court "gave segregation its seal of approval" and explained "so long as
were separate but equal, they were constitutionally acceptinstitutions
3
able.""
The battle between the North and South over slavery ultimately
''
ended in the Civil War, which had become "a crusade against slavery. 14
President Lincoln delivered his Emancipation Proclamation, and later,
105.
See John B. Clutterbuck, Note, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundationsof Enterprise Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131, 1138 (1988).
106.
Id.
107.
Pierce, supra note 5, at 630.
108.
Id.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 69. Southern states continued to expand the body of slave
109.
law; for example, slaves could not enter into a legal marriage, and it became a crime to teach a slave
to read or write. Id.
110.
See id.
111.
Id. at 69-70.
Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the PeculiarInstitution in American Legal Develop112.
ment, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1009, 1032 (1993).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 70.
113.
114.

Id.
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the Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery-at least in theory.1 5 Although people in the North did not accept the institution of slavery, they
also did not treat African-Americans as equals. 1 6 Friedman argues that,
because the northern states after the Civil War had become indifferent to
7
southern slave practices,' ' the South "relapsed into white supremacy."'18
Friedman's "brief history" again raises unanswered questions. Were
white supremacy and segregation ways to extend the effects of slavery
despite its abolishment? Furthermore, why would the North suddenly
become indifferent to southern slave practices after crusading for years
for its abolition?
D. A Change in Crime and Punishment
The law of crime and punishment-specifically, the "rise of the
penitentiary and the development of urban police forces"-is another
area of the law that significantly changed in the nineteenth century." 9 In
colonial times, the onus was on the community to punish wrongdoers by
banishment, branding, or the like. 20 Friedman contends that, as opposed
to the godly colonial society, the booming population of the nineteenth
century brought a decay of community morals, and disorder and riots in
2
the streets, giving rise to a demand for urban control.' ' The law responded by creating the penitentiary. 122 Friedman explains that "the penitentiary was designed to remove the criminal" from the community while
posits, the penienabling the prisoner to reform. 123 In addition, Friedman
24
punishment.1
capital
reduce
to
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tentiary
Friedman describes the Cherry Hill penitentiary in Pennsylvania as
an example of the nineteenth century .penitentiary.125 The prison system
began as a strict, regimented system.' 2 In Cherry Hill, inmates were isolated and not allowed to speak under any circumstances pursuant to the
to think and prepare for re-entry into society would retheory that 2time
7
form them.1
By the late nineteenth century, the strictly regimented system had
evolved into a more rehabilitative process. 28 Credit for good conduct
115.
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122. See id. at 81 ("The community was no longer a cure for deviance, but if anything the
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was considered in the release process, and the parole system was introduced into the criminal justice system.129 Friedman explains that the
"whole point of these devices was to shift emphasis away from the offense, and put the emphasis on the offender himself-his character, his
personality, his propensities for good and evil."'130 As society progressed
towards a more individualistic society, Friedman argues, so did the law
itself.13 Here, as in his Crime and Punishment in American History,
Friedman "portrays the criminal law as a product of social forces-a
mirror of the society it regulates."'' 32 According to one commentator,
Friedman's narrow focus fails to consider "the power of the law to shape
social values," and, thus, "makes it an incomplete portrait of the criminal
law" and the justice system "in American history.' ' 133 The law itself "has
great power both to preserve the social order and to promote change, and
it is Friedman's failure to describe this half of the relationship between
law and society that renders his account flawed."' 134
III. LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The twentieth century produced a huge body of new law. In his account of American legal history during this period, Friedman again
evaluates a vast array of subjects pertinent to the era. A few of his central
topics here include: criminal justice and the role of the federal government, the evolution of tort law, and the Civil Rights Movement.
A. CriminalJustice and the Role of the FederalGovernment
In the twentieth century, social changes spurred change in the definition of crime and in the applicable punishments. 35 Friedman argues
that new technologies and innovations required new law.136 Automobiles
computers created the need for laws to punish
increased bank robberies;
37
hacker.1
computer
the
Along with the increase in technological advancements, came the
growth in the federal government's role in criminal justice. 3 8 The federal
government became involved in criminal justice for the first time, pass-
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ing a vast amount of federal criminal legislation. 39 Crime ultimately
became "a national issue-an issue in presidential politics.""' For ex14 1
ample, President Hoover appointed a task force to study violent crime,
and the growth of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under J. Edgar
Hoover's leadership opened the door for the federal government's entry
into the "law enforcement business.' 42
States also began to tighten up their criminal justice systems by
cracking down on a new surge of violent crime. 143 Friedman explains
that, beginning in Washington State in 1984, states began to enact "truth
in sentencing laws."' 144 These laws required criminals to serve no less
than 85 percent of their entire prison sentences, thus eliminating to a
large degree credits given for good behavior."4 5 Federal monetary incentives for prison construction accompanied these "truth in sentencing
laws," '46 and most states jumped on the bandwagon to receive the federal
grants. 147

Heightened societal demand to punish criminals, along with federal
monetary incentives, stimulated the growth of the United States' huge
population of prisoners according to Friedman." 48 Friedman's argument
partially explains the increase in the prison population, but does not address the effect the law itself has on the population of prisoners. Some
attribute the prisons' population growth to the growing number and com49
plexity of laws, which creates more reasons to prosecute an individual.1
Friedman posits that the war on drugs is another reason for the dramatic growth in the prison population. 150 Friedman discusses how
American values and the law have eliminated most other victimless
crimes, such as sex outside of marriage.' 5' However, the drug laws remain an anomaly that in many states make possible life imprisonment for
a drug offense. 52 Friedman draws a valid conclusion here, but fails to
acknowledge the underlying American societal values inherent in the
139.
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crime to transport a stolen vehicle into another state. In addition, a large body of law was passed
governing prohibition. Id.
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decision to fill prisons with non-violent drug offenders. Many people
perceive, or even believe, an act is criminal because it is illegal. 53 In
addition, "law confers legitimacy because it persuades us that the existing social order is necessary, and, if not ideal, at least reasonable."' 154 In
other words, "the criminal justice system legitimates its own rules and
outcomes.' 55 Again, Friedman's critics note, "Law has great power both
to preserve the social order and to promote change."' 156 Thus, Friedman
fails to address the independent impact57that law, itself, can have on social
order and law enforcement in society.1
In his analysis, Friedman fails to consider how history has shaped
the development of twentieth century change. Although he correctly
identifies new aspects of modem-day technology that require changes to
be made in the law, such as the rise of computer crime, he fails to develop this theory. How did we get from there to here? Is moral decay
multiplying exponentially over time, creating the social need for new
laws, or is America creating new laws that criminalize more behavior?
Friedman recognizes that prohibition and the drug wars "put millions of
dollars into the pockets of men like Al Capone,"' 5 8 yet
he fails to realize
159
it.
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B. Tort Law in the Twentieth Century
As the twentieth century progressed and society became more individualistic, the nature of tort law had to change.16° No longer could a
court consistently side with enterprise. 16' One prominent example occurred in the area of products liability. 62 Friedman discusses the landmark case of MacPhersonv. Buick163 to support this contention.
In MacPherson, the plaintiff purchased an automobile with a defective wheel, which caused an accident that injured him. 164 MacPherson
sued the auto manufacturer, Buick. 165 Historically, under the law of privity, MacPherson could have sued only the dealer from which he purchased the automobile because no privity existed between him and the
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manufacturer. 166 Friedman asserts that "[Judge] Cardozo effectively undermined the old rule," thereby giving birth to products liability as we
now know it and signaling the end of the age of enterprise. 67 For the first
time, privity was abandoned in tort, and "if a product was dangerous, and
caused harm, the victim must be able to sue the manufacturer directly."' 168 After MacPherson, many other states followed Cardozo's
holding and169removed privity as an obstacle in determining liability in a
tort action.

Friedman explains that liability expanded dramatically after
MacPhersonwith the emergence of the strict liability doctrine in which a
product manufacturer could be held liable despite no finding of negligence.170 Friedman's analysis, again, attributes legal development to
changes in the economy and the rise of individualism, but fails to address
another important social phenomena-the growing demand for fairness.' 7' The practical distinction between the time of Farwell and
MacPherson is that an emerging concern in twentieth century society
was protecting the small party to an accident; that fairness should be172a
factor in determining risk of loss, shifting the risk toward big business.
The early years of national development were lean times, when society
placed a high value on strengthening the economy, but during prosperous
times that followed the Industrial Revolution, society came to view corporations as too powerful. Because the corporate defendant generally has
the deepest pockets, 173 in some cases fairness dictates
that liability should
174
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C. The Civil Rights Movement
In addition to dramatic changes in tort law, Friedman also discusses
one of the twentieth century's most significant historical developmentsthe Civil Rights movement.17 After many years of segregation and unfair treatment of African-Americans, the Supreme Court overruled Plessy
177
v. Ferguson.176 In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education,
the Court ruled that "all school segregation violated the Fourteenth
166.
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Amendment."' 7 8 Friedman argues that, although Brown was a cautious
case in that
it only pertained to education, Brown was the beginning of
79
the end. 1
After Brown, Friedman asserts the "Supreme Court struck down
every instance of official apartheid that came before it: parks, swimming
pools, public facilities in general.' 80 Friedman suggests that federal
court jurisprudence changed race relations dramatically and that, in the
last half of the century, "race relations in the United States were totally
revolutionized."' 8 1 This is true with respect to the changing racial
dynamics in the country and the acceptance of minorities in equal
positions in the work force. However, Friedman fails to discuss the
lingering impact of race consciousness and geography on American
society in the twenty-first century.
Soon after the courts ordered desegregation, many schools fell directly back to segregated conditions. Although segregation ceased to
exist in its most heinous form, which historically had barred AfricanAmerican children from particular schools, segregation remained in the
form of geographic segregation and socioeconomic inequality because
many minorities lacked the financial resources to live in wealthier, predominantly white school districts. 82 Therefore, race relations cannot
possibly be totally revolutionized as Friedman suggests because, had race
have
relations been revolutionized, socioeconomic segregation would
83
ended with court-ordered integration of schools and workplaces.1
With respect to the twentieth century, Friedman provides an interesting account of the change in the criminal justice system due to increased federal criminal legislation. In addition, he effectively documents
the change in tort liability and the significant progress made in the Civil
Rights Movement. Although he fails to identify the impact that law itself
can have upon society, and belittles the complications inherent in desegregation, Friedman's overall presentation of the law's role in the twentieth century is adequately portrayed.
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IV. AMERICAN LAW AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY

In the last temporal era in his book, Friedman explores the role of
the legal profession in modem America and the shift toward national
unity. Although society has become more individualistic over time, the
national government has unified the nation by providing all Americans
access to information on an equal basis. Although little time has passed
in the present century, Friedman gives an exceptional account of law's
current role in society.
A. The Lawyer's Role in the New Millennium
Friedman argues that the law continues to be an important aspect of
American life.184 The role of the legal profession has become vital to our
society due to the sheer volume of law created in the past two centuries.1 85 "In a society where 'law' is everywhere, there is everywhere a
need for people who know how to use it or abuse it.' 186 The economy
Americans worked so hard to build over time created and will continue
to create new legal problems. As Friedman asserts, "All big modern
economies need lawyers."'' 87 Whether running the administrative state,
writing a contract, or sealing 1a88deal, the modem economy needs legal
help, and thus it needs lawyers.
In the past, Friedman has been criticized for failing to give "any
systematic consideration of the interrelationship of law, legal institutions,
lawyers, legal education, and legal literature and their relative impact on
the development of American legal history."1 89 Here, Friedman remedies
the problem by describing the lawyer's role in everyday life and history,
discussing the continuing surge in the number of law schools, and the
many different facets of business that the law must address. 90 Although
Friedman does not address the effects that the growing legal community
has "on the nonlegal spheres with which it admittedly interacts," 191 his
account of how the function of modern day lawyers and law firms has
evolved explains even to the layperson the need for lawyers in contemporary American society.
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B. The Shift Toward National Government
Friedman also contends that the shift towards national government
seems to be a continuing trend. 92 Americans are coming together as a
unified nation, "[a]nd, as the culture gravitates to one central point, so,
too, does the law."' 193 Friedman explains that "in times of crisis-the
Great Depression, the two world wars, the savage attack on the World
Trade Center in September 2001-the country looks to its leader, to its
center, to the national government. ' 94 Americans look to Washington
for answers to "national problems" because, as Friedman persuasively
argues, "[cllassic federalism is, in truth, quite dead."' 195 Friedman posits
that "the federal government can do almost anything-can regulate anything-and the restrictions of federalism do not really hem it in."'196 For
example, even if the state retains the power to freely spend block grants
provided by the federal
government, "Congress can choose not to use"
197
them if it wishes.
Friedman argues that another reason that society gravitates toward
the federal government is increased media attention. 198 The President has
become a movie star in the spotlight.' 99 Friedman contends that the media and the public are consumed with his role as leader of the government and entertained by his personal life. 20 Government in the twentyfirst century sits in a glass house, which everyone peers into through the
media. 20 1 As a result, "what we see is of course not 'government,' but
images and personalities. The public knows less and thinks it knows
more." 20 2 Friedman makes an interesting point in asserting that government is bigger because we see more of it. An alternate view, however, is
that the government is growing in complexity20 3 and, therefore, citizens
may feel they need to know more in order to adequately protect their
interests. In addition, Americans want to know more; society is hooked
on the national government's daily soap opera produced by the media.
To that effect, Friedman observes that "the.celebrity nature of authority,
of leadership, means that society is governed, not so much by the invisible hand, as by the visible tube., 20 4 As such, "politics [have] become just

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2,at 170.

204.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 182.

Id. at 171.
Id. at 171-72.
Id.
at173.
Id.
at171.
Id.
at 173.
See id.
at175.
See id.
at176.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Wright, supra note 149, at 717-18.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

another reality show, like Survivor or Big Brother. The electorate is the
audience. The campaign is the show. 2 °5
Friedman's short account of the role of law in the new millennium
is proportionate to the short period of time that has passed since its beginning. Friedman effectively explains the importance of the legal profession in our complicated society. In addition, he gives a keen account
of the relationship between the media and society's shift to unify as a
nation through a mutual interest in the national government.
CONCLUSION

From colonial America to the present, a vast amount of law has
been created in response to the needs and norms of society. Friedman's
Law in America: A Short History is a quick trip though time, displaying
his view of the relationship between law and society. In addition to
showing how society shapes current law, this book also gives a unique
account of the relationship between the law and economy. Friedman provides an accurate account of the historical reasoning and development of
American law, although his book could expand on.certain areas of the
law to present a more thorough look at every temporal era covered in the
book. These few shortcomings are likely due to the fact that it is a "short
history." Friedman artfully explains how history creates and moves the
law and how law ultimately is a reflection of our society. As Friedman
concludes, "Law is the glue that binds the cells of Leviathan's body; and
the body of society itself."20 6 This book is worth the read and may be
attractive to both the legal historian and the lay reader, wishing to take a
limited glance at America's legal history and, particularly, how economic forces drive legal change.
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